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Abstract 
While many studies have examined the financial performance of sustainable investing (SI), 
little is known about the social and environmental impact of SI. We address this research gap 
in a multi-disciplinary literature review. We begin by developing a definition of investment 
impact, and a framework that clarifies the relationship between an investor’s impact on a 
company and a company’s impact on the real world. Focusing on investor impact, the literature 
review brings together evidence on three mechanisms: shareholder engagement impact, capital 
allocation impact, and indirect impacts. We find direct evidence that investors can affect 
companies through shareholder engagement, especially when the costs of demanded reforms 
are low, investors wield influence, and companies have prior experience with engagement. We 
find only indirect evidence for the capital allocation impact, yet studies indicate that this impact 
is more likely when SI investors hold a large market share, deviate strongly from the market 
portfolio, and focus on assets that are hard to substitute. The capital allocation impact is also 
more likely when companies depend on external financing for growth, and when the cost of 
conforming with the expectations of SI investors is low. Indirect effects, where investors rely 
on intermediaries to influence companies, have little support in the literature. Our results 
suggest that investors can increase their impact by expanding engagement efforts, by focusing 
on widely shared priority issues, making sure these issues are assessed consistently, and by 
targeting markets where external capital is a limiting factor. 
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Introduction 
Sustainable investing (SI) was originally devised as a tool to improve the world. Historically, 
when it was still called ‘responsible investing’, the Quakers divested from businesses 
associated with slavery, and colleges divested from companies to protest the South African 
apartheid regime (Molthan, 2003). Also today, many investors are attracted to SI by altruistic 
motives (Hartzmark and Sussman, 2017; Riedl and Smeets, 2017), expecting that SI will 
allow them to make a positive contribution. In line with this desire from investors, 
policymakers discuss SI as a mechanism to help realize the UN’s sustainable development 
goals (Betti, Consolandi, and Eccles, 2018), as well as to hold back climate change (IPCC, 
2014). 
Over the last decades, the SI industry has increasingly adopted the so-called ‘business 
case’, which emphasizes the financial performance of SI, rather than its social and 
environmental contributions (Richardson, 2009). SI has also grown rapidly over the last 
decades; some studies estimate that one in four dollars globally is in SI (GSIA, 2016). 
Academic research on SI has overwhelmingly embraced the logic of the business case. Over 
2000 studies examine the financial outcomes of SI (Friede, Busch, and Bassen, 2015), yet 
only a few studies investigate the environmental and social outcomes of SI (see e.g. Rivoli, 
2003). 
This results in a problematic research gap: while SI is assumed to be a tool to improve 
the world, its impact on environmental and social outcomes is unclear. It is unknown, for 
instance, whether the enormous growth of SI has contributed in a meaningful way to a 
reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions. This knowledge gap has an important ethical 
dimension because important goals ought to be pursued with effective means (Singer, 2015). 
SI has both the potential to greatly facilitate the achievement of global development goals, as 
well as to divert substantial human and financial resources from other, more effective means. 
Thus, before investors and policymakers rely on SI as a means to address some of the world’s 
greatest challenges, there is an urgent need to investigate the impact of SI. 
An important reason for the existence of this research gap is that the issue of 
investment impact cuts across disparate disciplines. Relevant studies can be found in 
financial economics (Hong and Kacperczyk, 2009), business ethics (Rivoli, 2003), legal 
scholarship (Richardson, 2009), and industrial ecology (Koellner et al., 2008). At this point, 
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there is no scholarship that investigates investment impact holistically and brings together the 
existing evidence that is available on the topic of investment impact. 
This review article takes stock of what is currently known about the investment 
impact of SI. First, we provide a definition and a framework for investment impact, in order 
to clarify the concept and to set the scope of the literature review. We highlight that 
investment impact consists of two complementary components, namely investor impact – the 
impact of investors on companies and company impact – the impact of companies on the 
outcomes that are ultimately desired (Brest and Born, 2013). Focusing on investor impact, we 
identify mechanisms through which investor impact can be achieved and review a wide range 
of literature that deals with these mechanisms. In doing so, we assess the level of empirical 
evidence for these mechanisms and identify the key determinants on which the mechanisms 
depend. In the discussion, we draw out the implications of our findings for the current 
practice of SI and highlight opportunities to increase the investment impact of SI. 
Conceptual Framework 
The literature review in this article is focused on investor impact, by which we mean the 
impact that investors have on companies. To explain this concept and show how it relates to 
the general idea of impact, we begin by developing a conceptual framework that reflects 
investment impact as a whole. The framework was developed on the basis of established 
concepts from development finance. However, it was adapted and refined in consultation 
with practitioners from the SI field. The goal of the framework is to bring conceptual clarity 
to the idea of investment impact while also reflecting all the components and mechanisms 
that are deemed relevant by practitioners.  
The framework illustrated in Figure 1 reflects three key theoretical assumptions about 
investment impact. First, impact is defined in terms of the change in social and environmental 
parameters. Second, investors affect these social and environmental parameters through 
companies they interact with. Third, there are different mechanisms to achieve investment 
impact. In the following, we elaborate on these assumptions. The framework is illustrated in 
Figure 1. 
Definitions 
The notion of impact has originally been developed in development finance. The world bank 
characterizes impact as “(…) causal effects of a program on an outcome of interest” (Gertler 
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et al., 2011).  There is a rich literature concerned with impact evaluation, mostly with 
applications to development finance and foreign aid (Bamberger, Rugh, and Mabry, 2012). In 
this literature, impact is consistently described as having three defining characteristics: (1) it 
describes a change against a baseline, (2) it relates to a clearly defined parameter, and (3) it 
implies causality. Applying these characteristics to the case of SI, we define investment 
impact as “change in a specific social or environmental parameter that is caused by the 
actions of an investor”.  
We apply the idea of investment impact to sustainable investing (SI), which we define 
broadly as “any form of investing that considers environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) information as part of the investment process”. This definition is the lowest common 
denominator between the definitions provided by various industry associations (USSIF, 
EUROSIF, SSF, EFAMA, PRI) and also consistent with the view of the European Parliament 
(European Parliament, 2013).  
 
Figure 1: Framework outlining the components and mechanisms of investment impact 
 
The components of investment impact 
Investors affect the real world through the companies they interact with. To reflect this in our 
framework, we follow Brest & Born (2013) and split investment impact into two 
components. Company impact describes the impact of a company on the natural and social 
environment. Investor impact describes the impact of the investor on the company. 
Investment impact describes the additional company impact that is due to the activities of an 
investor. By altering a company’s impact, an investor can ultimately influence social or 
environmental parameters.  
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Consider for example a company that manufactures solar panels and achieves a 
certain amount of carbon emission savings with each solar panel sold. The company’s carbon 
reductions are equal to the number of solar panels sold times the carbon emission savings per 
panel – this is the company impact. Investors can increase this company impact by helping 
the company to scale and sell more solar panels. Assume an investor provides capital that 
enables the company to double its output – this is the investor impact. The overall investment 
impact in this example is the change that the investor caused in the company’s impact on 
global carbon emissions.  
This example makes clear that investor impact and company impact are 
complementary. When a company has zero company impact, investors cannot have an impact 
through that company. Likewise, when the investor impact is zero, investors cannot have 
impact on the company, regardless of how impactful the company’s activities may be. 
Investment impact results only when both investor impact and company impact are present.  
The mechanisms for achieving investment impact 
Having clarified the components of investment impact, we turn to the mechanisms behind 
investment impact. These mechanisms describe how concrete actions by investors and 
companies are connected and ultimately result in investment impact. Figure 1 shows the 
identified mechanisms for investor impact and company impact as arrows.  
Investor impact can be achieved through three primary impact mechanisms: (1) 
shareholder engagement impact refers to influencing a company through various 
communication mechanisms that are open to investors, such as dialogue and shareholder 
votes. (2) capital allocation impact refers to supporting a company by providing capital - or 
inhibiting a company by denying the provision of capital. (3) indirect impacts refer to a range 
of impacts that investors can have on a company through intermediaries that are not direct 
agents of the investor, for example the company’s stakeholders, rating agencies, or other 
investors. 
Through these mechanisms, investors can achieve two different types of changes in 
company activities. Investors can either cause a company to scale its activities, for example 
by enabling the company to grow. Alternatively, investors can cause a company to change its 
activities, for example by influencing the company to adopt a new technology. Whether such 
a changing or scaling of activities propagates into a real-world impact depends in turn on the 
impact of these activities - the company impact.  
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Company impact can be achieved through two primary mechanisms: (1) directly 
through the company’s operations, i.e., its emissions, its employees, and its resource 
consumption, and (2) indirectly through the products and services the company provides or 
purchases.  
We acknowledge two limitations of this theoretical framework. First, investors could 
have impact not only through companies, but also through other investable entities such as 
countries, or real estate projects. While the impact mechanisms may be similar for these 
cases, we did not consider these cases explicitly in the literature review, and our conclusions 
do not necessarily apply. Second, investors may also have impact while bypassing companies 
or other investable entities altogether, for example through direct engagement with 
regulators. While this could be an effective measure to have impact, we exclude these types 
of direct impacts, because actions such as lobbying are not uniquely available to investors.  
Methodology 
Scope of the literature review 
The literature review is focused on investor impact, based on three considerations. First, 
investor impact immediately speaks to the investment activities of sustainable investors and 
has the most direct implications for sustainable investors. Second, the literature on company 
impacts is very broad, as company impacts differ enormously for each industry and context. 
As a result, a thorough review of the literature dealing with company impact would be 
beyond the scope of this paper. Third, rating agencies are already developing measures for 
company impact, whereas the concept of investor impact is still widely ignored in practice.  
The aim of the literature review is to identify and to bring together the available stock 
of scientific knowledge on each of the three mechanisms of investor impact. We then analyze 
these stocks of knowledge in two specific ways. First, we assess the empirical evidence om 
each of the mechanisms. Second, we identify the key determinants on which the effectiveness 
of the mechanisms depends.  
We conduct a multi-disciplinary literature review, given that the concept of investor 
impact cuts across disparate literature streams. For each mechanism, we searched academic 
databases for suitable keywords. We extended this range by also searching for central 
concepts and keywords contained within identified articles. For example, the concept of 
“stock price elasticity” was identified as an important theoretical basis for the capital 
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allocation impact, directing our search towards a large body of literature dealing with stock 
price elasticity. This approach ensured that we could identify all articles that are important for 
the various mechanisms, even if they use different terms to describe the mechanisms, or deal 
only with essential aspects of the mechanisms in our framework. 
Using this approach, we identified a total of 51 relevant articles from a range of 
different disciplines. The capital allocation impact is dealt with mostly in the financial 
economics literature, specifically asset pricing and corporate finance. The shareholder 
engagement impact is dealt with mostly in the corporate governance literature, as well as in 
management science. The indirect effects are dealt with primarily in business ethics, 
management science, and sociology. 
Literature Review 
Shareholder engagement impact 
Shareholder engagement refers to actions undertaken by shareholders with the intention of 
changing a company’s activities. This includes the right to vote on shareholder proposals 
during annual general meetings, discussions during informal meetings with management, as 
well as criticizing corporate practices in news outlets.  
The impact of shareholder engagement is relatively straightforward to trace. An 
investor requests a company to implement a certain change, and the investee either follows 
through or not. There are four empirical studies that analyze the extent to which companies 
comply with shareholder engagement requests (Barko, Cremers, and Renneboog, 2017; 
Dimson, Karakaş, and Li, 2015, 2018; Hoepner et al., 2016). 
Dimson et al. (2015), analyzing a dataset of over 2152 shareholder engagement 
requests between 1999 and 2009, report that 18% were successful in the sense that the 
request was implemented by the company. Hoepner et al. (2016) report a success rate of 28% 
in a dataset of 682 engagements between 2005 and 2014. Expanding on these results, Barko 
et al. (2017) report a success rate of 60% in a sample of 847 engagements between 2005 and 
2014. Dimson et al. (2018) report a success rate of 42% in a sample of 1,671 engagements 
between 2007 and 2017. Together, these studies provide strong evidence that shareholder 
engagement is an effective mechanism through which investors can change company 
activities. 
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The success probability of any particular shareholder engagement depends on a host 
of determinants related to characteristics of the engagement request, the engaged company, 
the engaging investor, and the specific process of engagement (Goranova and Ryan, 2014). 
The studies reviewed above highlight three specific determinants that have an important 
influence on the average rate of success. 
The first determinant is the cost of the reform that is associated with complying with 
the engagement request. A consistent finding of the reviewed studies is that requests in the 
environmental domain tend to have lower success rates compared to requests in the social 
domain, and requests in the corporate governance domain have the highest rate of success. 
Dimson et al. (2015) attribute this to the fact that reforms in the environmental domain are 
likely to be more costly than in the governance domain. More explicitly, Barko et al. (2017) 
show that material requests that require some form of reorganization have lower success rates 
compared to less material requests. Taken together, these findings indicate that the chances of 
success decrease with the costs of the requested reform. 
The second determinant is investor influence. There is evidence that engagement 
requests are more likely to succeed, when the engaging shareholder holds a larger share of the 
targeted company (Dimson et al., 2015, 2018). However, investor influence increases not 
only with the size of the holdings. Dimson et al., (2018) find that a group of engaging 
investors has more influence when the engagement is spearheaded by an investor that is from 
the same country as the engaged company, suggesting that linguistic and cultural aspects may 
play a role as well. Additionally, the chances of success rise when asset managers that are 
large and internationally renowned are part of the group of engaging investors. 
The third determinant is the company’s level of ESG experience. The success rate of 
engagement is higher with companies that have previously complied with engagement 
requests (Barko et al., 2017; Dimson et al., 2015). Furthermore, companies that have high 
ESG ratings prior to the engagement are more likely to comply with engagement requests 
(Barko et al., 2017). 
Taken together, these studies provide strong evidence that shareholder engagement 
exerts a significant influence on companies. The impact of shareholder engagement depends 
on the cost of the requested reform, on the investor’s influence, and on the company’s level of 
ESG experience.  
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Capital allocation impact 
The capital allocation impact describes the mechanism where, by allocating capital towards 
certain sustainable activities, investors increase the amount of these sustainable activities. 
This mechanism is relevant whenever sustainable investors exclude non-sustainable 
companies from their portfolios or concentrate their investments in sustainable companies. 
While the impact of capital allocation may seem intuitive at first sight, it touches upon a 
rather fundamental question, namely to what extent the decisions of investors influence the 
course of the real economy.  
We were not able to find studies that relate the capital allocation decisions of 
sustainable investors to corporate investment activities or operational practices. Hence, direct 
empirical evidence for the capital allocation impact is lacking. However, several strands of 
literature cover central aspects of capital allocation impact and indicate determinants on 
which it depends. We structure the review of the literature along the questions: 1) How do 
investment decisions of sustainable investors influence asset prices? 2) How do changes in 
asset prices influence companies’ activities? 
The effect of investment decisions on asset prices 
Two empirical studies, which investigate sustainability preferences in stock markets, come to 
opposing conclusions regarding the effect on share prices. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) 
examine the effect of investors excluding “sin stocks”, such as tobacco, alcohol, and 
gambling from their portfolio. They show that sin stocks have depressed share prices and 
exhibit outperformance of 2.5% per year, relative to comparable stocks. This result implies 
that the moral aversions of investors against sin companies have decreased stock prices of 
these companies. At the same time, a related study focusing on the effects of divestment in 
the context of the South Africa boycotts in the 1980s, concludes that the divestments had no 
discernible effects on asset prices (Teoh, Welch, and Wazzan, 1996). 
Recent studies on green bonds, i.e., bonds that are issued to finance projects with 
environmental benefits, show that the sustainability preferences of investors can influence 
bond prices. Baker et al. (2018) find that at issue, yields of green bonds are on average 0.06% 
below the yields of comparable bonds. They present supporting evidence that the observed 
differences are caused by non-financial preferences of investors. Similarly, Zerbib (2019) 
show that sustainability preferences of investors result in a negative yield premium of 0.02% 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3289544 
 10 
for green bonds. Also, Hachenberg and Schiereck (2018) confirm that green bonds are traded 
with a negative yield premium. 
Taken together, these studies provide evidence that non-financial preferences of 
investors can affect asset prices. However, the results differ substantially in terms of effect 
size and do not reveal the determinants of the effect size. To understand these determinants 
better, we review additional strands of literature within financial economics. 
One insightful perspective comes from a theoretical literature that considers the 
consequences of investor tastes in equilibrium models. Following the efficent market 
hypothesis, i.e., assuming full rationality and information of all market participants as well as 
the absence of transaction costs, prices should purely be defined by fundamentals (Fama, 
1970). However, several studies show that the existence of non-financial tastes can distort 
asset prices, in otherwise efficient markets. Based on standard asset pricing models, Fama 
and French (2007) argue that taste-neutral investors require a premium for balancing out the 
portfolio choices of investors sharing a particular taste because it forces the neutral investors 
to deviate from the market portfolio1. The impact of sustainable investors’ tastes on asset 
prices has been explicitly modeled in three papers (Beltratti, 2005; Heinkel, Kraus, and 
Zechner, 2001; Luo and Balvers, 2017).  
In accordance with the predictions of Fama and French (2007), all three models show 
that there are two main determinants on the effect of sustainability tastes on asset prices. 
First, the total effect size, as well as marginal effect size per additional dollar increases with 
the fraction of wealth commanded by sustainable investors. Hence the effect of an individual 
investor’s decisions depends on how many others invest according to the same non-financial 
preferences. Second, the effect is weaker when a company or industry is easily substitutable 
                                               
 
1 Fama and French (2007) also show that disagreement among investors on the probability 
distributions of future payoffs leads basically to the same price distortions as non-financial tastes of 
investors. The only difference is that the effects of taste on asset prices are persistent, while the effects 
of disagreement eventually disappear once the actual development of cash flows is revealed. Hence, 
the model suggests, for example, that investors, who believe that oil stocks are overpriced given 
regulatory efforts to limit global warming have the same effect on prices as investors who think oil 
stocks are ethically unacceptable – until it becomes evident whether oil stocks are indeed overpriced. 
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from a portfolio diversification perspective, e.g., if its returns are strongly correlated with 
business cycles. 
Another perspective is provided by empirical studies of stock price elasticity. These 
studies confirm that non-fundamentally driven changes in demand can influence stock prices. 
A large set of studies make use of the fact that, due to passive investors, the inclusion or 
exclusion of companies to or from popular indexes triggers substantial investments in or 
divestments from these firms. Several studies focus on the S&P 500 index (e.g., Beneish and 
Wahley, 1996; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; Shleifer, 1986; Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 
2002). Kaul, Mehrotra, and Morck (2000) make use of a rule change of the TSE 300 index; 
Chang, Hong, and Liskovich (2015) focus on additions to the Russel 2000 index, applying a 
regression discontinuity approach. These studies find that the observed sudden changes in 
demand do affect stock prices and that, hence, demand curves for stock slope down. Studies 
that make use of order-books (Ahern, 2014), announcements of equity issues (Loderer, 
Cooney, and Van Drunen, 1991) or auction repurchases (Bagwell, 1992) come to similar 
conclusions as the literature on index inclusions.  
There is no consensus on how steep demand curves for stocks are, i.e., how strongly 
changes in demand affect share prices.  A useful measure for the steepness of demand curves 
in stock markets is the price elasticity of demand.2 Highly negative elasticity values indicate 
little influence of changes in demand, whereas less negative values indicate a stronger 
influence of demand on prices. The results by Loderer et al. (1991), Kaul et al. (2000), 
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) as well as Ahern (2014) indicate elasticities of around -5 to 
-10. The studies by Bagwell (1992), Chang et al. (2015) and Shleifer (1986) indicate lower 
elasticities between -1 and -1.5. While these studies do not agree on how strongly share 
prices react to changes in demand, price elasticities are higher than, for example, those of 
food and non-alcoholic beverages, which range from -0.3 to -0.8 (Andreyeva, Long, and 
Brownell, 2010).  
                                               
 
2 Price elasticity of demand is defined here as (%ΔQ / % ΔP), where Q is the quantity of the 
demanded good and P it’s price. As for stocks, supply curves are vertical, Q can be interpreted as 
excess demand (Wurgler and Zhuravskaya, 2002). Hence, a price elasticity of -10 implies that a 1% 
increase in prices leads to an 10% decrease in demand. Vice versa, an increase in demand by 10% 
would be associated with a 1% increase in prices. The elasticity of flat demand curve would be 
negative infinity; and changes in demand would not affect prices. 
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Only a few studies investigate demand effects in private markets, such as markets for 
private equity and venture capital. Gompers and Lerner (2000) show that a doubling of 
inflows of capital increases the valuation of new investments of venture capital funds 
between 7% and 21%. This would correspond to an elasticity of -5 to -14. Diller and Kaserer 
(2009) confirm that demand effects influence private equity funds’ return.  
Both Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) and Ahern (2014) find that stocks with low 
substitutability show a lower price elasticity. This implies that prices for stocks that are not 
easily replaceable with similar assets react stronger to changes in demand. This is in line with 
the findings derived from equilibrium models, as reported above. 
The effect of changes in asset prices on corporate activities 
Even if the preferences of sustainable investors succeed to alter asset prices, this may not 
necessarily translate into changes in corporate activities. So far, there is no empirical 
evidence that the capital allocation decisions of sustainable investors have affected corporate 
activities. However, the reviewed literature identifies two general channels how companies 
can be affected by changing asset prices: Changes in costs of capital can influence how fast 
companies are able to scale their activities, while managerial incentives can cause companies 
to change their activities. 
The first channel operates via the cost of capital. As stock markets define the cost of 
equity capital, they may affect corporate investment activity, as postulated by Fischer and 
Merton, (1984). An increase in stock market valuation caused by investor’s taste may make it 
more attractive for a company to raise equity capital to implement investment options. Vice 
versa, depressed share prices may force companies to reduce investment opportunities. 
However, as pointed out by Beltratti (2005), companies shunned on stock markets may shift 
towards debt financing if sustainability preferences are not shared by debt investors as well. 
Accordingly, Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) show that sin companies seem to rely more on 
debt financing, possibly evading the effect.  
Empirical work shows that reduced costs of capital do not necessarily translate in 
increased corporate investment and growth. Baker et al. (2003) show that the sensitivity of 
investment activity to non-fundamental movements in stock prices is only high for firms that 
depend on external capital. According to Kaplan and Zingales (1997) many publicly traded 
companies do not depend on external capital. Especially large, established companies often 
have sufficiently large cash flows to cover investments. In contrast, a series of empirical 
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studies show that small firms, young firms, firms operating in less mature financial markets 
with weak institutions as well as firms with less tangible assets are more likely to be 
restricted in their investment activity by the cost of external financing (Almeida and 
Campello, 2007; Beck et al., 2006; Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008; Bloom et 
al., 2010; Rajan and Zingales, 1996). Especially in developing countries, many small and 
medium-sized companies are completely lacking access to external financing (Beck, 2007; 
Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2006). The finding that many small firms are restricted by the cost 
of capital or even access to capital is consistent with the finding that most small companies 
use retained earnings, insider finance, and trade credit to finance their investments (Berger 
and Udell, 1998; Carpenter and Petersen, 2002). Financing constraints seem to have a 
particularly strong inhibiting effect on entrepreneurial activities. Evans and Jovanovic (1989), 
as well as Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) show that wealthy individuals are much 
more likely to become successful entrepreneurs. Hence, the likelihood that changes in asset 
prices influence the growth of a company increases with the degree to which a company is 
restricted by external financing conditions. 
The second channel operates via managerial incentives. Edmans et al. (2012) argue 
that when managerial incentives are tied to stock market value, managers will be sensitive to 
shifts in the share price of their corporation – regardless of the reliance on external financing. 
Thus, if SI leads to a shift in asset prices, conforming to the expectations of sustainable 
investors can be profitable (Gollier and Pouget, 2014). The key criterion for this to hold is 
that the cost of reform is lower than the expected gain in market valuation. Based on their 
equilibrium model, Heinkel et al. (2001)  provide a numerical example in which at least 20% 
of the market need to apply a common screen, to create the incentives to implement reforms 
that cost a company 5% of its annual cash flow. 
Summary 
While there is evidence that the preferences of sustainable investors can influence asset 
prices, so far there is no direct evidence that these changes have altered corporate activities. 
However, based on the reviewed literature we can identify a number of factors that make 
capital allocation impact more or less likely.  
The effect of investor decisions on asset prices increases with the market share of 
investors with common non-financial preferences as well as the degree to which the 
portfolios of these investors deviate from the market portfolio. It decreases with the 
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substitutability of affected assets. Considering these factors, the outperformance of sin stocks 
reported by Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) may represent an upper bound for the effect 
sustainable investors can have on stock prices3. 
The cost of reform determines whether changes in asset prices provide managerial 
incentives to change corporate practices or whether those changes mainly affect the 
company’s growth by altering its cost of capital. The likelihood of whether a company’s 
growth is influenced by changes in the cost of capital decreases with the size, age, the 
tangibility of its assets, as well as the maturity of financial markets it is operating in. For 
companies that do not have access to capital markets, such as many small and medium-sized 
firms in developing countries, the questions of capital allocation impact is reduced to whether 
a company has viable investment options that could be realized with external capital. 
Whereas the reviewed studies agree on the direction in which the identified factors 
influence the capital allocation effect, the results differ substantially regarding the magnitude 
of influence. Thus, while we can say that the capital allocation impact of a given investment 
decision depends on the identified determinants, the literature to date does not allow a 
quantification of the capital allocation impact. 
Indirect Impacts 
Next to the impacts of shareholder engagement and capital allocation, investors may also 
influence companies indirectly through intermediaries. We identified four different indirect 
impact mechanisms: stigmatization impact, endorsement impact, benchmarking impact, and 
demonstration impact.  
Stigmatization impact 
Investors can stigmatize a company by divesting the company’s assets or categorically 
excluding it from their portfolio. Apart from a capital allocation impact that this might have, 
                                               
 
3 The aversion against sin stocks is arguably one of the most widely shared non-
financial preferences among investors. At the same time the returns of sin stocks are largely 
independent of business cycles, and thus sin stocks are not easily substitutable in a diversified 
portfolio. 
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the action can also impact other relevant stakeholders of the company. For example, people 
might be deterred from working at a company that is excluded by investors. Literature on this 
stigmatization impact, however, is thin. In a detailed assessment of the carbon divestment 
movement, Ansar, Caldecott, and Tilbury (2013) postulate that one of its most important 
impacts might be the stigmatization of the fossil fuel industry. For the anti-apartheid 
divestment campaign, there is anecdotal evidence that it helped to lift the issue of Apartheit 
on the political agenda. Desmond Tutu, South African archbishop and an important figure in 
the struggle against the Apartheid regime commented that the disinvestment campaign in the 
US added punch to their political struggle (Knight, 1990). However, we were not able to find 
studies that analyze to what extent exclusion decisions by sustainable investors have lead to 
stigmatization.  
Endorsement impact 
Investors can endorse companies for their social or environmental performance by including 
them in their portfolio or sustainability index. Such an endorsement may help to increase the 
visibility and reputation of a company, indirectly helping the company to gain customers or 
motivate employees. We were not able to identify studies that analyze to what extent 
company reputation was improved as a consequence of investor endorsement. There are two 
studies, however, that investigate whether companies that were included in a sustainability 
index decided subsequently to communicate this inclusion to stakeholders (Carlos and Lewis, 
2018; Searcy and Elkhawas, 2012). The fact that companies communicate index inclusion 
suggests that such an inclusion helps to improve reputation, yet the studies do not investigate 
the magnitude of this impact. They show, however, that nearly half of the companies that 
were included in the Dow Jones Sustainability Index chose not to communicate their 
inclusion publicly. Carlos and Lewis (2018) find that companies are more likely to remain 
silent about their index membership, when they have a strong reputation for ESG 
performance already. Thus, one important determinant of the endorsement effect seems to be 
a company’s prior ESG reputation. 
Benchmarking impact 
SI is feeding a growing industry of ESG rating agencies. These rating agencies develop 
standards, create ESG benchmarks, and request increasing amounts of data from companies. 
The growth of this industry is likely to encourage companies to report on their practices, in 
order to satisfy the increasing data demands. Measuring and reporting may then also induce 
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companies to improve their performance, for example because companies are benchmarked 
against peers.  
The literature provides no direct evidence that investors have impact via their support 
of ESG rating agencies. However, a number of studies have investigated the impact of 
standards and ratings on social and environmental performance. Regarding standards, there is 
one study that concludes that the introduction of the voluntary ISO 14000 standard for 
environmental management has led firms to improve their environmental outcomes (Melnyk, 
Sroufe, and Calantone, 2003). Another study, however, concludes the adoption of this 
standard had no discernible effect on environmental outcomes (Hertin et al., 2008). 
Studying ESG benchmarks specifically, Chatterji and Toffel (2010) provide evidence 
that companies improve environmental performance in response to receiving a low rank in an 
environmental benchmark. They find this especially to be the case when the cost of reform is 
low, and when the industry operates in a highly regulated industry. A problem with this effect, 
however, is that there are remarkable differences between ESG benchmarks compiled by 
different agencies (Chatterji et al., 2016). Due to these differences, the authors conclude that 
“SRI ratings will have a limited impact on driving rated firms toward any particular shared 
behaviors”. One important determinant of the effectiveness of the benchmarking impact is 
thus the consistency of ESG benchmarks. 
Demonstration impact 
One investor engaging in SI may encourage other investors to do the same so that the original 
investor has an indirect effect through those additional investors. While exactly this 
“mainstreaming” of SI was a key goal of industry associations such as the Principles for 
Responsible Investing (PRI), we found no research documenting such a demonstration effect 
in the context of SI.  
Summary 
In summary, there is no direct empirical evidence for any of the considered indirect impacts. 
This is not surprising, given that indirect impacts are difficult to measure. By definition, they 
involve an additional intermediary, so that both the investor’s impact on that intermediary as 
well as the impact of the intermediary on the company need to be considered. As a result, 
indirect impacts could be relevant, but they are inherently uncertain and hard to measure. 
We find no concrete evidence for the stigmatization impact and the demonstration 
impact. Parts of the endorsement impact and the benchmarking impact have been studied, and 
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these studies revealed two determinants. Endorsement impacts are likely to be more relevant 
for companies with low ESG reputations. Benchmarking impacts are likely to be more 
relevant, when different ESG benchmarks are consistent. 
Discussion 
Academic literature has shown enormous interest in SI, most prominently under the theme of 
‘doing good by doing well’. However, this literature has almost exclusively focused on the 
‘doing well’ part, and hardly investigated the ‘doing good’ part so far. This is problematic 
because the central motivation to study the financial performance of SI is the assumption that 
it has a positive impact. If SI did not have at least some social and environmental benefits, its 
financial performance would be quite irrelevant from a scholarly point of view. The 
assumption that SI has positive impact, however, should not be taken for granted – it needs to 
be examined.  
This article begins to examine the impact of SI and makes three central contributions 
in doing so. First, the article provides a conceptual basis to evaluate the social and 
environmental impacts of SI going forward. Second, the article provides a comparison of 
different impact mechanisms based on available literature. Third, the article identifies critical 
research gaps that need to be closed in order to work towards a quantification of investment 
impact. Furthermore, the results of this article have important implications for practitioners, 
in particular for data providers and fund managers. In the following, we discuss these points 
in detail. 
A basis for the evaluation of investment impact 
As a first contribution, this article provides a basis for evaluating investment impact going 
forward. It provides a definition and a framework of investment impact, specifying what is 
meant with ‘doing good’ in the context of SI. The definition is parsimonious and flexible. 
And yet, it introduces key requirements that are suited to constrain the excessive use of the 
term ‘impact’, notably that merely analyzing company impact does not provide a measure of 
investment impact.  
In addition to the definition, this article puts forward a framework that clarifies the 
key steps and mechanisms that comprise investment impact. This framework may serve to 
structure the discussion about investment impact beyond this article. The article has shown 
that the concept of investment impact cuts across a wide variety of disciplines. This means 
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that in order to fully understand investment impacts, financial economists, management 
scholars, sociologists, and ecologists will need to collaborate and complement each other. 
The framework could support this multi-disciplinary effort by highlighting where different 
disciplines can contribute to the overall understanding of investment impact.  
Assessment and comparison of investor impact mechanisms 
As a second contribution, the article provides a comprehensive assessment and comparison of 
the identified investor impact mechanisms, based on the current academic literature. In 
particular, the article compares the level of empirical evidence supporting the mechanisms 
and identifies the key determinants on which the different impact mechanisms depend. These 
key results are summarized in Table 1. 
Shareholder engagement emerges from the literature review as a relatively certain 
way to achieve impact. Several studies provide direct evidence that investors have impact on 
company activities through shareholder engagement. The studies also identify three key 
determinants. The investor impact of shareholder engagement increases with the influence of 
the engaging investor and the ESG experience of the engaged company. The investor impact 
decreases with the cost of the requested reforms. Shareholder engagement is therefore suited 
as a mechanism that reliably results in impacts, which investors could quantify and 
communicate.  
The capital allocation impact emerges from the literature review as a somewhat 
uncertain way to achieve impact since the literature provides no direct evidence that SI 
influences company activities through capital allocation. However, its individual parts have 
been analyzed in detail and are relatively well understood. As a result, there are clear 
indications regarding the determinants on which capital allocation impacts depend. The 
capital allocation impact increases with the share of sustainable investors having the same 
sustainability preferences, the extent to which these preferences results in deviations from the 
market portfolio, and the company’s dependency on external capital. The capital allocation 
impact diminishes with the substitutability of the assets that are under- or overweighted as 
well as with the cost of reform. Given the lack of direct quantitative evidence, the capital 
allocation effect could range between substantial and negligible, depending on these 
determinants. 
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Table 1: Comparison of impact mechanisms  
Mechanism Level of empirical 
evidence 
Key Determinants 
Direct Impacts   
Shareholder 
Engagement 
Impact 
Direct evidence  
Entire mechanism 
has been analyzed 
1. Investor influence (+) 
2. Company’s level of ESG experience (+) 
3. Cost of requested reform (-) 
Capital 
Allocation 
Impact 
Indirect evidence 
Key parts of the 
mechanism have 
been analyzed 
separately 
1. Market share of SI investors (+) 
2. Deviation from market portfolio (+) 
3. Substitutability (-) 
4. Cost of reform (-) 
5. Dependence on external capital (+) 
Indirect Impacts   
Stigmatization 
Impact 
No evidence  
Endorsement 
Impact 
Partial evidence 
Some parts of the 
mechanism have 
been analyzed in 
isolation 
1. ESG reputation prior to endorsement (-) 
Benchmarking 
Impact 
Partial evidence 
Some parts of the 
mechanism have 
been analyzed in 
isolation 
1. Consistency of ESG benchmarks (+) 
Demonstration 
Impact 
No evidence  
 
Finally, indirect impacts emerge as very uncertain from the literature review. By 
definition, indirect impacts are routed through an additional intermediary, which prolongs the 
causal chain between an investors action and its effect on a company. While there is 
anecdotal evidence for indirect impacts, none of these impacts has been analyzed 
comprehensively, in the sense that the action of an investor was related to company activities. 
There is no empirical evidence for the stigmatization and the demonstration impact. There is 
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partial evidence for the endorsement and the benchmarking impact. Endorsements are likely 
to be more valuable when the endorsed company has a low ESG reputation. Benchmarking is 
likely to be more effective when different ESG benchmarks are consistent, i.e. they identify 
the same laggards and leaders. It’s important to note that the evidence on these indirect 
impacts is only partial, there may be additional determinants that have not been identified yet.  
Research gaps 
As a third contribution, this article identifies critical research gaps that inhibit SI funds from 
monitoring and increasing their investment impact. Regarding shareholder engagement, an 
important practical research question is how to report the impact of engagement activities. A 
handful of empirical studies have shown that it is feasible to quantify impact. A next step 
could be to formulate reporting guidelines to ensure that these impacts are comparable across 
different cases and regions and can be reported in a standardized and understandable format. 
Regarding capital allocation impact, there is currently no empirical study that relates 
capital allocation decisions by sustainable investors to corporate investment decisions. Hong 
& Kacperczyk (2009) point out that while their study demonstrates an effect on the share 
prices of tobacco companies, it does not investigate the effects on the activities of tobacco 
companies. Studies that relate SI activities not only to asset prices but also investigate the 
response of affected companies in terms of management and investment decisions would 
advance the understanding of investor impact decisively because it would provide direct 
evidence of investor impact through capital allocation. 
Regarding indirect impact, there is a need for studies that investigate the entire causal 
chain of indirect impacts. Existing studies document indirect impacts only partially. Due to 
their complexity, indirect impacts are suited for qualitative research methods. Comprehensive 
case studies that carefully trace indirect impact mechanisms could provide important 
guidance when indirect impacts matter and in which way they could be pursued most 
fruitfully. 
Implications 
Our results have important practical implications for the SI industry. First, it suggests that 
data providers have an important role in developing impact measures that reflect company 
impact and investment impact. Second, the article points out concrete ways in which 
investors and fund managers could evolve the current practice of SI towards greater 
investment impact. 
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The key data providers of the SI industry are the so-called environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) rating agencies. ESG rating agencies, such as MSCI, Sustainalytics, or ISS 
have developed comprehensive datasets that reflect companies’ sustainability performance 
across a wide spectrum. Portfolios of SI funds tend to overweight companies with good ESG 
ratings and underweight companies with poor ESG ratings. SI funds are also benchmarked 
regarding their portfolio-weighted ESG ratings, such as the Morning Star Sustainability 
rating. As a result, ESG ratings play an important role in guiding SI decisions. 
Recently, several ESG data providers have begun to develop impact metrics that relate 
company performance to wider outcomes such as the United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals (see e.g. Vörösmarty et al., 2018). These efforts are a very important step 
to guide SI towards greater impact. And yet, these metrics are incomplete as long as they are 
focused only on company impact and do not reflect investor impact. 
At the portfolio level, metrics that exclusively consider company impacts result in 
misleading assessments of a fund’s overall investment impact. Such metrics do not 
distinguish between funds that have a major investor impact, and funds that have negligible 
investor impact. As a result, a fund that successfully induces emission intensive companies to 
improve their practices may appear to have less impact than a fund that simply has exposure 
to companies that already have these practices in place. As a result, metrics based only on 
company impact cannot indicate a fund’s overall investment impact. 
Therefore, ESG data providers should complement their assessments of company 
impacts with an assessment of investor impact. This article provides an initial overview of the 
relevant mechanisms and determinants that would be relevant for such an investor impact 
assessment. While estimating investor impact will require investment in novel 
methodologies, developing these methodologies may be attractive due to their scalability: 
company impacts require different methodologies for each industry, investor impacts apply 
generally to any investment.  
For investors and fund managers, the article points to a number of concrete ways in 
which the impact of current approaches to SI could be increased. While SI is a diverse 
industry and any investment has some impact in principle, the bulk of SI assets is currently 
invested in ways that promise relatively modest and perhaps even negligible investment 
impact. In the US, only 10% of SI assets are associated with shareholder engagement (USSIF, 
2018), meaning that the most reliable impact mechanism is only rarely used. Also, the capital 
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allocation impact may not be very relevant in practice. Frequently, SI funds focus on the 
stocks and bonds of large established companies that are least sensitive to capital allocation 
impacts. In addition, while the overall market share of SI assets is growing, it is diluted by 
disagreement about which companies are the most and least sustainable (Chatterji et al., 
2016). Thus, the current practice of SI offers a number of ways to increase impact. 
First, fund managers could expand shareholder engagement activities. A number of 
studies identify shareholder engagement as a reliable mechanism to achieve investment 
impact. Shareholder engagement is also quite flexible, as it can be combined with most 
existing investment approaches. SI funds and service providers already practicing shareholder 
engagement could exploit the fact that the impacts of shareholder engagement are measurable 
and communicate their actual investment impacts more prominently. 
Second, investors could enhance capital allocation impacts by considering the 
determinants identified in this article. Regarding market share, sustainable investors could 
coordinate and focus on a few, widely shared priority issues and make sure that they are 
consistently assessed. The most promising priority issues would be practices that have major 
company impact, but which can be implemented by companies at low or even negative costs. 
Finally, SI funds might focus on companies and markets where external capital is a limiting 
factor, such as small-cap growth stocks in emerging markets.  
Third, investors who are convinced that they can have indirect impacts could attempt 
to demonstrate these effects. While indirect effects have currently little scientific support, SI 
funds could provide examples and proxies that make these effects more tangible. For 
instance, investors could measure media attention in response to an exclusion announcement. 
Fund managers who launch an innovative product could track the uptake of their innovation 
by others to support their demonstration impact. Data providers, finally, could also attempt to 
show how their work with companies leads to operational improvements, and share these 
findings with the investors that pay for their services. 
Finally, the SI industry could profit from adopting a common definition of investment 
impact. This article provides a succinct definition, along with a framework that might aid the 
practitioner debate around impact. The basic idea that investment impact refers to the 
contribution that investors make towards a company’s real-world impact is straightforward. A 
clear understanding of investment impact would help to distinguish it from other objectives 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3289544 
 23 
associated with SI, such as risk management or value alignment, and provide essential 
support to SI funds that indeed achieve investment impact. 
Limitations 
We acknowledge three limitations. First, the presented recommendations are based on 
qualitative observations. While the literature review allowed us to identify mechanisms and 
determinants, we cannot judge the relative importance of some determinants in comparison to 
others. Such a quantitative comparison would, however, be an interesting future research 
project. 
Second, the academic literature is biased towards publicly listed corporations and 
stock markets, due to data availability. Accordingly, also this literature review is somewhat 
biased towards public stock markets. There are potentially further relevant impact 
mechanisms in specific financial markets, such as corporate debt, private equity, bank 
lending, and real estate, which are not reflected in this article. 
Third, this review article was limited to investor impact, even though company impact 
is an equally important component of investment impact. It is challenging to review company 
impacts, given that company impacts are very industry specific. Nevertheless, a thorough 
review of company impacts would provide a helpful complement to this article. 
Conclusion 
Increasingly, SI is thought of as a tool to achieve environmental or social outcomes, such as 
the United Nation’s sustainable development goals. However, to date there is very little 
research that investigates the impacts of SI, creating a wide research gap around a rather 
fundamental issue. This article begins to close this research gap by way of a multi-
disciplinary literature review. It makes three specific contributions. 
First, the article provides a definition of investment impact, along with a framework 
that identifies the central components and mechanisms of investment impact. The framework 
highlights that investor impact and company impact are separate but complementary 
components of investment impact. For mechanisms of investor impact, the framework 
distinguishes shareholder engagement impact, capital allocation impact, and indirect impacts. 
Second, the article conducts a systematic literature review of the investor impact 
mechanisms. It brings together the available evidence for three impact mechanisms and 
identifies for each mechanism the key determinants that increase or decrease investor impact. 
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Shareholder engagement emerges as the only impact mechanism that is directly supported in 
the literature. There is no direct evidence for the capital allocation impact, but the literature 
clearly identifies the determinants on which it depends. Indirect effects have little support in 
the literature so far. 
Third, the article derives key implications for data providers and SI funds. Data 
providers could play an important role in stimulating the impact of SI by providing measures 
that reflect both company and investor impact. Investors who want to have impact could 
expand shareholder engagement activities and increase their capital allocation impact, for 
example by screening for specific corporate practices with low reform costs in unison with a 
large coalition of investors, or by focusing on small and medium-sized companies that have 
positive company impact but lack access to external capital. 
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